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THE RISKS OF CLOUDED PROPERTY TITLE
FOR CANNABIS BUSINESS OWNERS, INVESTORS,
AND CREDITORS
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Jason Liu‡
ABSTRACT
This Article provides a brief primer on the surprising range of assets that the
CSA forfeiture provisions govern for the state-legal cannabis businesses. It
outlines these provisions for tangible as well as intangible property, with an
emphasis on risks to state-legal cannabis businesses’ intellectual property and
issued securities. We argue that these forfeiture risks create clouded title for all
subject tangible and intangible property—not only for the state-legal busi-
nesses and their proprietors, but also for those businesses’ outside investors,
creditors, and suppliers/contractors.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Even as Washington State, Colorado, and now Oregon and Alaska,
have “state-legal” cannabis businesses, there are so many ways in
which these businesses are anything but ordinary.  The effects of can-
nabis’s remaining under Schedule 1 of the Controlled Substances Act
(“CSA”)1—and thus illegal to manufacture, distribute, or dispense (or
possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense)2—have
been unexpectedly far-reaching. Few banks will open cannabis busi-
† Boeing International Professor and Faculty Director, Cannabis Law & Policy
Project, University of Washington School of Law (Seattle).  The Authors thank the
staff of the Journal for hosting the Symposium and excellent editorial support in the
publication of this Article. All errors are the Authors’ own.
‡ Student and Cannabis Law & Policy Project Researcher, University of Wash-
ington School of Law (Seattle).
1. Controlled Substances Act, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1242 (Oct. 27, 1970)
(codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801 et. seq.).
2. 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2012).
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ness accounts,3 resulting in the dangers of all-cash businesses moving
substantial amounts of money. Federal bankruptcy courts will not take
on insolvent cannabis businesses for fears of being involved in drug
transactions if the courts mandate the transfer of cannabis product, or
even just aiding and abetting criminal activity (including money laun-
dering) by allocating other assets of cannabis businesses.4 Thus, even
as the aforementioned states seek to regulate and normalize cannabis
business markets, they are faced with knotty legal issues arising from
the federal-state tension over cannabis that might derail such efforts.
One such issue that has received insufficient attention in the legal
academic literature is the forfeiture rules under the CSA.5 Fans of
Miami Vice, and other television shows or movies focused on law en-
forcement and drug producers and dealers, will be quite familiar with
the notion that agents and prosecutors can seize not only the illicit
drugs themselves, but also weapons, luxuries, and other assets of the
bad guys.6 Slick yachts and cars are memorable law enforcement
targets if they can be tangentially linked with CSA violations.7 But
actually, such property can be seized even if it was simply obtained as
the proceeds of the illegal acts, or derived from those proceeds.8 But
because federal law does not distinguish between shadowy under-
world drug deals and the clean, well-lit places licensed and regulated
under the new state-legal regimes, all of the forfeiture rules apply
equally to both. Accordingly, the facade of legitimacy and regularity
rapidly attaching to the most well-intentioned state-legal cannabis
businesses is, of course, quite illusory. And while many observers un-
derstand that all of these businesses and their proprietors and employ-
ees run the risk of federal prosecution, it is not clear whether enough
of those businesses—or their investors, suppliers, and creditors—real-
ize that all property owned by or related to these businesses is subject
to seizure and forfeiture.
This Article provides a brief primer on the surprising range of assets
that the CSA forfeiture provisions govern, even for the state-legal
cannabis business. It proceeds by outlining the CSA and its forfeiture
provisions in Part II. Tangible property in the form of real property
and personal property is analyzed in Part III. Intangible property in
3. Jeremy Berke, This could be the No. 1 problem facing legal weed businesses in
America, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 12, 2015, 4:46 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/
americas-marijuana-companies-cant-put-money-in-banks-2015-11.
4. See Casey C. Sullivan, Colorado Marijuana Businesses Barred From Bank-
ruptcy Court, FINDLAW (Sept. 3, 2015, 2:36 PM), http://blogs.findlaw.com/
tenth_circuit/2015/09/colorado-marijuana-businesses-barred-from-bankruptcy-
court.html.
5. § 853.
6. Miami Vice, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Miami_Vice (last visited
Apr. 17, 2016) (showing series creator Anthony Yerkovich created the concept after
learning about asset forfeiture as applied to bolster law enforcement).
7. § 853(a)(2).
8. § 853(a)(1).
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the form of intellectual property and securities is analyzed in Part IV.
The Conclusion sums up the risks of clouded title that these forfeiture
provisions impose on not only state-legal businesses and their proprie-
tors, but also for outside investors, creditors, and suppliers/
contractors.
II. THE CSA’S FORFEITURE PROVISIONS
The CSA, passed in 1970, consolidated various federal drug laws
into a cohesive system of regulations. The system created “Schedules,”
or classifications of controlled substances with different levels of regu-
lation.9  The most restrictive level, “Schedule I,” was reserved for
drugs or substances that have: 1) a high potential for abuse; 2) no
currently accepted medical use or treatment potential in the United
States; and 3) lack accepted safe use for the drug or other substance
under medical supervision.10 “Marihuana”11 was placed into Schedule
I.12
For Schedule I drugs and substances, the CSA prohibits their manu-
facture, distribution, or dispensation, as well as their possession with
intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense.13 Penalties for such acts
include not only fines and imprisonment,14 but also both criminal and
civil forfeiture of various enumerated property to the United States.15
Criminal forfeiture can occur where individuals have violated CSA
provisions punishable by more than one year in prison.16 Such forfei-
ture applies to:
(1) any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds the
person obtained, directly or indirectly, as the result of such
violation;
(2) any of the person’s property used, or intended to be used, in any
manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, such
violation; and
(3) in the case of a person convicted of engaging in a continuing
criminal enterprise in violation of section 848 of this title, the person
shall forfeit, in addition to any property described in paragraph (1)
9. § 812.
10. § 812(b)(1).
11. “The term “marihuana” means all parts of the plant Cannabis sativa L.,
whether growing or not; the seeds thereof; the resin extracted from any part of such
plant; and every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of
such plant, its seeds or resin. Such term does not include the mature stalks of such
plant, fiber produced from such stalks, oil or cake made from the seeds of such plant,
any other compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of such
mature stalks (except the resin extracted therefrom), fiber, oil, or cake, or the steril-
ized seed of such plant which is incapable of germination.” 21 U.S.C. § 802(16) (2012).
12. § 812(c) (Schedule I, item (c)(10)).
13. § 841(a).
14. § 841(b).
15. §§ 853, 881.
16. § 853(a).
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or (2), any of his interest in, claims against, and property or contrac-
tual rights affording a source of control over, the continuing crimi-
nal enterprise.17
“Property” for purposes of such criminal forfeiture is defined to
include:
(1) real property, including things growing on, affixed to, and found
in land; and
(2) tangible and intangible personal property, including rights, privi-
leges, interests, claims, and securities.18
Criminal forfeiture is also governed by the civil forfeiture provisions
of Section 881, to the extent not inconsistent with Section 853.19 Civil
forfeiture generally turns on the nature of the property, or its actual or
intended uses. The following kinds of property are subject to seizure
and “no property right shall exist in them” by statutory provision:
(1) All controlled substances which have been manufactured, dis-
tributed, dispensed, or acquired in violation of this subchapter.
(2) All raw materials, products, and equipment of any kind which
are used, or intended for use, in manufacturing, compounding,
processing, delivering, importing, or exporting any controlled sub-
stance or listed chemical in violation of this subchapter.
(3) All property which is used, or intended for use, as a container
for property described in paragraph (1), (2), or (9).
(4) All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which
are used, or are intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to
facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or conceal-
ment of property described in paragraph (1), (2), or (9).
(5) All books, records, and research, including formulas, microfilm,
tapes, and data which are used, or intended for use, in violation of
this subchapter.
(6) All moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things of
value furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in ex-
change for a controlled substance or listed chemical in violation of
this subchapter, all proceeds traceable to such an exchange, and all
moneys, negotiable instruments, and securities used or intended to
be used to facilitate any violation of this subchapter.
(7) All real property, including any right, title, and interest (includ-
ing any leasehold interest) in the whole of any lot or tract of land
and any appurtenances or improvements, which is used, or intended
to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the
commission of, a violation of this subchapter punishable by more
than one year’s imprisonment.
(8) All controlled substances which have been possessed in violation
of this subchapter.
(9) All listed chemicals, all drug manufacturing equipment, all
tableting machines, all encapsulating machines, and all gelatin cap-
17. 21 U.S.C. § 853(a) (2012).
18. § 853(b).
19. § 853(j).
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sules, which have been imported, exported, manufactured, pos-
sessed, distributed, dispensed, acquired, or intended to be
distributed, dispensed, acquired, imported, or exported, in violation
of this subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter.
(10) Any drug paraphernalia (as defined in section 863 of this title).
(11) Any firearm (as defined in Section 921 of Title 18) used or
intended to be used to facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt,
possession, or concealment of property described in paragraph (1)
or (2) and any proceeds traceable to such property.20
Once seized, all right, title, and interest to such property is vested in
the United States by statute.21
In the wake of Colorado’s and Washington State’s respective initia-
tives to state-legalize recreational cannabis, the U.S. Department of
Justice (“DOJ”) took a cautious response. Rather than taking any di-
rect action against the states or officials within them tasked with im-
plementing the recreational systems, the DOJ instead issued an
internal guidance memo to U.S. attorneys. Popularly called the Cole
Memo after its author, U.S. Deputy Attorney James M. Cole, the doc-
ument recommended that U.S. attorneys use a set of drug enforce-
ment priorities in deciding where and how to allocate limited
government resources to cannabis prosecutions.22 The guidance was
particularly directed to attorneys in states with “robust” state cannabis
regulatory regimes. The eight priorities are:
(1) preventing the distribution of marijuana to minors;
(2) preventing revenue from the sale of marijuana from going to
criminal enterprises, gangs, and cartels;
(3) preventing the diversion of marijuana from states where it is
legal under state law in some form to other states;
(4) preventing state-authorized marijuana activity from being used
as a cover or pretext for the trafficking of other illegal drugs or
other illegal activity;
(5) preventing violence and the use of firearms in the cultivation
and distribution of marijuana;
(6) preventing drugged driving and the exacerbation of other ad-
verse public health consequences associated with marijuana use;
(7) preventing the growing of marijuana on public lands and the
attendant public safety and environmental dangers posed by mari-
juana production on public lands; and
(8) preventing marijuana possession or use on federal property.23
State regulatory regimes, such as that of Washington State, were set
up expressly to avoid tripping any of these eight prosecution priorities,
20. § 881(a).
21. § 881(h).
22. Memorandum from U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of the Deputy Attorney
Gen., on Guidance Regarding Marijuana Enforcement (Aug. 29, 2013) [hereinafter
Cole Memo II], http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/305201382913275
6857467.pdf.
23. Id.
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which also appeared in an earlier memo issued by Cole.24 Presumably,
if the DOJ has de-prioritized cannabis business activities outside of
these eight triggers in robustly regulated state systems, then it will also
not seek forfeiture of those businesses’ properties. But none of this is
certain. At the same time, a rider to an appropriations bill in Congress
last year prohibited the DOJ from using any congressionally appropri-
ated funds for cannabis prosecutions for businesses or individuals op-
erating under robust state regulatory systems.25 Notwithstanding this
prohibition, the DOJ continued its prosecution of a California dispen-
sary until a federal judge recently harshly rebuked the DOJ’s theory
of why its actions were not technically a use of appropriated funds.26
While this ruling might seem to be a major victory for regulated can-
nabis businesses, the DOJ’s willingness to go to court to protect its
ability to prosecute cannabis CSA violations, regardless of both the
guidance of the Cole Memo and the Congressional appropriations bill,
suggests that the DOJ is not quite ready to give up cannabis
enforcement.
Accordingly, the prospect of both criminal and civil forfeiture is
very much a live issue for cannabis businesses. The DOJ can retract or
supersede the Cole Memo at any time, and Congress may decline to
renew the appropriations restriction with sunsets by its own terms.
Further, a new presidential administration will take office in January
2017 and will set its own cannabis policy, which could be looser or
stricter than the Cole Memo under the current Obama
Administration.
III. TANGIBLE PROPERTY
For purposes of our analysis here, we will divide property subject to
forfeiture into two categories: tangible and intangible. In this Part we
consider tangible property. Such property is broken into two further
categories of real property and personal property.
The CSA provides law enforcement agencies broad discretion in the
taking of land in proportion to the CSA violation. Courts have inter-
preted the statute to allow forfeiture of entire tracts of land even
when CSA violations occurred on only part of the land or when the
comparative worth of the drugs found was minimal. In United States v.
40 Moon Hill Road, the court held that an entire tract of property was
24. Memorandum of U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of the Deputy Attorney Gen.,
on Guidance Regarding the Ogden Memo in Jurisdictions Seeking to Authorize Mari-
juana for Medical Use (June 29, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/
legacy/2014/07/23/dag-guidance-2011-for-medical-marijuana-use.pdf.
25. Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, H.R. 83, 113th
Cong. § 538 (2014) (prohibited the Department of Justice to use funds from the act to
prevent states from implementing medical marijuana frameworks).
26. United States v. Marin All. for Med. Marijuana, No. C 98-00086 CRB, 2015
WL 6123062, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2015), appeal filed, No. 15-17486 (9th Cir. Dec.
21, 2015).
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forfeitable despite the fact that the marijuana-growing operation took
place on only portions of the land.27 Furthermore, the land’s worth
was in excess of the worth of the cannabis articles that were seized.
Forfeiture of real property has also been allowed when the drugs
were intended for personal use. In United States v. 250 Kreag Road,
the court held that growing marijuana for personal medical use meets
the CSA’s forfeiture requirements.28 The court also rejected an argu-
ment that forfeiture constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.29
Other courts have rejected arguments that the provision is unconstitu-
tionally vague.30
However, the forfeiture provision does establish an “innocent
owner” defense, contingent on an owner’s subjective lack of knowl-
edge or consent.31 For example, property lessors may qualify for the
defense where they did not consent to the applicable CSA violations
occurring on the property or by taking action against it.32 However,
other lessors have been precluded from using the defense when they
failed to establish that they lacked knowledge of the CSA violations
occurring on their properties,33 or consented to them by not taking
action.34
With regard to personal property, federal courts have predomi-
nantly upheld seizure and forfeiture actions by the government.35 But
the range of types of property that may be seized might be surprising.
Essentially all kinds of property that might be related to the prohib-
ited activities are included.36 Certainly any controlled substances and
raw materials used to produce them can be seized. Beyond this, all
manner of business assets can also be seized: property that can be
used as containers for controlled substances; all conveyances including
aircraft, vehicles, or vessels used to transport controlled substances or
facilitate the prohibited activities; books, records, microfilm, and tapes
used to violate the CSA; moneys related to controlled substances
transactions or derived therefrom; all drug manufacturing equipment,
27. United States v. 40 Moon Hill Rd., 884 F.2d 41, 45 (1st Cir. 1989).
28. United States v. 250 Kreag Rd., 739 F. Supp. 120, 124 (W.D.N.Y 1990).
29. Id. at 124–25.
30. United States v. Santoro, 866 F.2d 1538, 1542 (4th Cir. 1989).
31. United States v. 2511 East Fairmont Ave., 722 F. Supp. 1273, 1281 (D. Md.
1989).
32. United States v. 141st St. Corp., 911 F.2d 870, 878 (2d Cir. 1990); United States
v. 418 57th Street, 922 F.2d 129, 130 (2d Cir. 1990).
33. United States v. 2011 Calumet, 699 F. Supp. 108, 110 (S.D. Tex. 1988).
34. 141st St. Corp., 911 F.2d at 879.
35. See, e.g., United States v. $10,000.00 in U.S. Currency, 348 F. Supp. 2d 612
(M.D.N.C. 2004) (requirement of probable cause showing of substantial connection
between the property forfeited and criminal activity); United States v. One 1975 Lin-
coln Cont’l, 72 F.R.D. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (vehicle forfeited in connection with drug
trafficking); United States v. U.S. Currency, $30,060.00, 39 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir. 1994)
(forfeiture of currency related to drug transactions).
36. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (2012).
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tableting machines, encapsulating machines, and gel capsules; and
firearms used or intended to be used to facilitate prohibited
activities.37
Given the modern high-tech nature of cannabis products—espe-
cially in the categories of edibles, vaping, sublinguals, and extracts38—
cannabis businesses may have significant capital assets subject to for-
feiture. In other words, the cannabis industry today is far different
from the Cheech and Chong days of mellow stoners smoking joints.39
Back then, production equipment often constituted only some grow
lamps, potting and gardening materials, scales, rolling papers and bag-
gies, and, of course, L.P. album covers or other suitable flat surfaces
for separating out seeds.40 By contrast, today’s most cutting-edge pro-
duction facilities look more like sophisticated biotech or chemistry
labs than Cheech and Chong’s crash pad.41 And the investment capital
required to equip these labs is likewise significant.42 Yet all of it is
funded, used, and accounted for on balance sheets under what can
only be construed as clouded title. The federal government can come
in at any time and, for no other reason than that the equipment is
being used in that state-legal cannabis business, seize the assets with
no compensation.43 The owners are deemed to have no property
rights in the equipment and, in fact, all rights, title, and interest vest in
the United States.44
IV. INTANGIBLE PROPERTY
Beyond the more obvious tangible property subsisting in cannabis
businesses’ raw materials, inventory, capital assets, and real estate, to-
day’s state-legal cannabis growers and processors are increasingly fo-
cused on intangible properties. These include two major categories:
intellectual property for product and process inventions, trademarks
for brands and packaging, and copyright for written materials; and se-
curities for investment capital including stock, convertible notes, and
37. Id.
38. What Type of Cannabis Therapy Is Best for You?, PROJECT CBD, https://
www.projectcbd.org/what-type-cannabis-therapy-best-you (last visited Apr. 17, 2016).
39. CHEECH AND CHONG, CHEECH & CHONG, http://cheechandchong.com/
bio (last visited Apr. 17, 2016).
40. See generally Danny Danko, Cannabis Cultivation Basics, HIGH TIMES
(Dec. 26, 2013), http://www.hightimes.com/read/cannabis-cultivation-basics; see gener-
ally GHUA, Using vinyl covers for cleaning pot?, INT’L CANNAGRAPHIC (May 7,
2010, 9:54 PM), https://www.icmag.com/ic/showthread.php?t=172286.
41. Greg James, Suspended Brands: The Cutting Edge of Technology, MARIJUANA
VENTURE (Apr. 7, 2016), http://www.marijuanaventure.com/suspended-brands-cut-
ting-edge-technology/.
42. See Calum Marsh, Five tips for growing and selling marijuana like a pro - from
a university instructor, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 25, 2015, 9:30 PM), http://
www.theguardian.com/society/2015/aug/25/five-tips-growing-selling-marijuana.
43. See 21 U.S.C. § 881 (2012).
44. § 881(a), (h).
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other hybrid debt-equity instruments. This Part shows how these in-
tangible properties are also subject to seizure and forfeiture under the
CSA.
A. Intellectual Property
Intellectual property (“IP”) is covered by a mix of federal and state
statutes and state common law rights. While federal rights may seem
most valuable—because of presumptive nation-wide coverage and au-
tomatic access to federal courts—state trademark rights have seen a
new level of interest in the cannabis industry.45 This is because the
United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) is not regis-
tering cannabis trademarks while state residency requirements for
state-legal cannabis licensees in states like Washington mean that out-
of-state holding trademark rights in other jurisdictions cannot enforce
them in state as a practical matter.46 This Section considers first fed-
eral IP rights in the cannabis and CSA context, and then turns to state
rights.
1. Federal Intellectual Property
Patents and copyrights are presently, as a practical matter, exclu-
sively the province of federal statutory law.47 Trademarks are a mixed
system of federal and state rights.48 Trade secrets are almost exclu-
45. See Sean K. Clancy, Branded Bud or Generic Ganja? Trademarks for Mari-
juana in Washington, 18 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1063, 1082–1084 (2014).
46. Jennifer Visintine, Branding your bud: Why trademarks are tricky for mari-
juana businesses, THOMPSON COBURN LLP (Aug. 27, 2015) http://www.thompsonco
burn.com/news-and-information/cannabis-blog/blog/15-08-27/branding-your-bud-
why-trademarks-are-tricky-for-marijuana-businesses.aspx.
47. Technically, states may still have the authority to issue patents, so long as those
grants do not interfere with the federal system. Early nineteenth century cases ex-
pressly left this issue open. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824), a seminal case involv-
ing state patents, was actually decided on Commerce Clause grounds because of the
effect of the New York State issued patents on shipping in interstate commerce (e.g.,
to New Jersey). It did not resolve the issue of whether states could continue to grant
patents after enactment of the first federal Patent Act in 1790, so long as those pat-
ents did not directly interfere with interstate commerce. Notwithstanding, no states
currently issue utility patents. Further, there is an argument that a Supreme Court
decision establishing a channeling of rights and powers as between state trade secret
systems and the federal patent regime implicitly prohibits states from issuing patents
as those would conflict with federal patents. See, e.g. Kewanee Oil v. Bicron Corp.,
416 U.S. 470, 472 (1974). On the copyright side, up until the 1976 Copyright Act,
federal law expressly left copyright for unpublished works to the states. However, that
Act abolished the distinction and therefore all copyrighted works created after the
effective date of the Act are exclusively governed by federal law. Pre-1976 Act copy-
rights on unpublished works remain in force under the terms of the state rights until
they expire by those terms. The 1976 Act appears to signal Congress’ intent to pre-
empt the field for federal pre-emption purposes, and so it is unlikely that any concur-
rent power to grant copyright protection is left to the states.
48. While Congress was directly authorized under the IP Clause of the U.S. Con-
stitution to create exclusive rights for writings and discoveries to authors and inven-
tors (generally deemed to mean copyright and patent systems), U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWR\3-1\TWR103.txt unknown Seq: 10  2-JUN-16 12:23
76 TEXAS A&M J. OF PROP. L. [Vol. 3
sively state rights, with the limited exception of some protections
available under the federal Economic Espionage Act.49 This Subsec-
tion covers the federal IP rights of patents, trademarks, and copyright.
Intriguingly, the USPTO, which as its name suggests covers both the
federal patent and trademark systems, is currently divided internally
on whether cannabis businesses should be able to secure federal IP
rights. On the patent office side, patents are being issued for methods
involving cannabinoids and for paraphernalia products.50 But on the
trademark office side, registrations are being refused for any cannabis,
marijuana, or related marks when they are to be used in a cannabis
business.
Even more fascinating, the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services is the assignee of U.S. Patent Number 6,630,507, “Cannabi-
noids as Antioxidants and Neuroprotectants.”51 The patent covers
methods of using cannabinoids with no psychoactive component to
minimize tissue damage in patients who have diseases caused by oxi-
dative stress, such as autoimmune diseases. But it is hardly the only
cannabis patent issued by the USPTO. Also cited by this patent are
U.S. Patent Numbers 5,538,993, 5,521,215, 5,284,867, and 5,434,295,
which cover uses of variants of THC or its homologs.52
With regard to cannabis paraphernalia, the USPTO has issued Pat-
ent Number 4,216,785 on “an improved smoking . . . pipe or bong.”53
Likewise this is not the only patent in its class, much less for parapher-
nalia generally. U.S. Patent Numbers 3,882,875 and 3,881,499 also
cl. 8, that Clause was held to not extend to trademarks. When Congress first sought to
create a federal trademark system in the late nineteenth century it passed an act that
would have given the federal government exclusive trademark authority under the IP
Clause. This was successfully challenged in In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82
(1879), in which the Supreme Court held that the IP Clause did not so authorize
Congress. Thus, under the later Lanham Act, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (1946),
Congress expressly tethered its trademark provisions to interstate commerce in order
to exercise its authority under the Commerce Clause instead, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 3. But this then explicitly left concurrent powers to the states for purely intrastate
trademarks.
49. Many states have enacted a version of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, see, e.g.,
WASH. REV. CODE § 19.108. But trade secrets can also be enforced under common
law tort misappropriation theories. In 1996, the United States enacted the Economic
Espionage Act particularly to cover trade secret theft by foreign nationals. Economic
Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-294, 110 Stat. 3488 (Oct. 11, 1996). A current
bill in Congress would significantly extend the reach of federal trade secret law, while
not appearing to fully pre-empt state law.
50. U.S. Patent No. 6,630,507 (filed Feb. 2, 2001); U.S. Patent No. 4,216,785 (filed
Aug. 25, 1977).
51. ‘507 Patent.
52. Id.; see also U.S. Patent No. 5,538,993 (filed Feb. 7, 1994); see also U.S. Patent
No. 5,521,215 (filed Feb. 7, 1994); see also U.S. Patent No. 5,284,867 (filed Apr. 8,
1992); see also U.S. Patent No. 5,434,295 (filed Feb. 7, 1994).
53. ‘785 Patent.
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cover water pipe/bong inventions.54 Of course, water pipe/bong pat-
ents can, and often are, drawn towards use with tobacco55 and “medic-
inal herbs,”56 such that the USPTO could plausibly claim that it was
not issuing a patent for an invention used in illegal activities.
There is no requirement that patents be issued only for legal activi-
ties. While the “moral utility” doctrine still technically exists, it re-
quires a high showing of the invention’s being effectively fraudulent in
nature and purpose, with no countervailing social benefit.57 In the
most recent notable invocation of the doctrine, a beverage dispenser
supply company challenged a patent for an invention wherein a trans-
parent compartment that contained a batch of the beverage visible to
customers was not the actual source of beverage dispensed to the cus-
tomer.58 Instead, a hidden apparatus combined the component ingre-
dients on the spot and then dispensed this freshly made beverage to
the customer. While the invention admittedly had a deceptive compo-
nent to it, the patent was not invalidated on moral utility grounds be-
cause that deception was essentially in the customer’s best interest to
minimize receiving an at best stale, and at worst contaminated or pu-
trid drink. This also makes sense given that patents are merely “nega-
tive rights.”59 The patent owner can merely prevent others from
making, using, or selling the invention; the issued patent gives no posi-
tive rights for the patent holder or anyone else to practice the inven-
tion. For example, a patent on a pharmaceutical gives its owner no
right to distribute the drug where it has not yet been approved by the
Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”).60 Following from this, an
inventor is not required to currently use, have ever used, or ever plan
to use an invention in order to file and receive patent protection.61 As
long as the patent is written broadly enough to encompass a legitimate
purpose or substance, the fact that the invention’s use is illegal does
not seem to prevent it from being patented.62
On the other hand, cannabis trademark registrations are currently
being rejected by the USPTO.  The federal Lanham Act provides pro-
54. U.S. Patent No. 3,882,875 (filed Sept. 20, 1973); U.S. Patent No. 3,881,499
(filed Sept. 11, 1973).
55. ‘499 Patent.
56. ‘785 Patent.
57. See, e.g., Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir.
1999).
58. Id.
59. Richard H. Shear & Thomas E. Kelley, A Researcher’s Guide to Patents,
132(3) PLANT PHYSIOLOGY 1127 (2003), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/
PMC526265/.
60. Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability, 87
TEX. L. REV. 503, 565 (2009).
61. See generally General Information Concerning Patents, USPTO (Oct. 2014),
http://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/general-information-concerning-patents
#heading-24.
62. See generally What Can Be Patented, USPTO (Oct. 2014), http://
www.uspto.gov/patents/resources/general_info_concerning_patents.jsp#heading-4.
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tection for “any word, name, symbol, or device” used to identify and
distinguish goods in commerce.63 Procedurally, an application for
trademark requires the applicant to: 1) list the goods on which the
mark is used,64 2) the classification of the goods,65 and 3) the date on
which the merchant first used the trademark in commerce in associa-
tion with the goods or services.66 Importantly, a merchant’s use of the
trademark must be in lawful commerce.67 Since the CSA clearly pro-
hibits the sale of cannabis, the USPTO has taken the position that any
commerce involving cannabis is unlawful, even under state-legal re-
gimes. A brief review of cannabis-product trademark applications
bears this out.68
However, the USPTO has allowed registrations for trademarks
used on ancillary goods and services related to cannabis products.69
For these registrations, the USPTO examiner has required applicants
to “submit a written statement indicating whether the goods and/or
services identified in the application comply with the Controlled Sub-
stances Act.”70 Failure to comply with the examiner’s requirements
63. 15 U.S.C § 1127 (2012).
64. 37 C.F.R. § 2.32(a)(6) (2014).
65. § 2.32(a)(7).
66. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(2).
67. TMEP § 907 (Apr. 2014 ed.); see also 37 C.F.R. § 2.69; see also CreAgri, Inc. v.
USANA Health Scis., Inc., 474 F.3d 626, 630–31, 634 (9th Cir. 2007) (denying protec-
tion for a dietary supplement trademark, “Olivenol,” because of federal labeling law
violations).
68. See, e.g., U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77,654,053 (filed Jan. 22,
2009) (“MARIJUANA” application abandoned); U.S. Trademark Application Serial
No. 86,054,742 (filed Sept. 3, 2013) (“WASHINGTON’S FINEST CANNABIS” ap-
plication abandoned for “Marijuana, Marijuana Infused Products, Cannabis, Canna-
bis Infused Products”).
69. Brett Trout, Marijuana Trademarks, BLAWGIT (July 27, 2010), http://
blawgit.com/2010/07/27/marijuana-trademarks/. For successful registrations see, e.g.,
MEDICAL MARIJUANA, Registration No. 4,024,120 (“[m]agazines about mari-
juana serving medicinal purposes”); MEDICAL CANNABIS CUP, Registration No.
4,259,895 (“[o]rganization and arrangement of educational and instructional seminars
and conferences regarding legal, medical and political developments and societal atti-
tudes about medical marijuana”); MJFREEWAY, Registration No. 4,330,124
(“[c]omputer services, namely, providing on-line non-downloadable web-based com-
puter software for patient documentation and history, inventory control, and inven-
tory management for use among medical marijuana centers, dispensaries, collectives,
and patients”); BUDRUZ, Registration No. 4,550,100 (“[p]roviding a searchable on-
line advertising website featuring the services of other vendors via the Internet,
namely, featuring services of medical marijuana dispensaries”). For pending registra-
tions, see, e.g., U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 85,850,934 (filed Feb. 15, 2013)
(“WOKE SMEED” notice of allowance issued for “[n]on-downloadable electronic
publications in the nature of an online journal, namely, a blog in the field of the
medicinal and recreational uses of marijuana”).
70. See, e.g., WOKE SMEED, Registration No. 85,850,934; U.S. Trademark Ap-
plication Serial No. 85,602,048 (filed Apr. 19, 2012); U.S. Trademark Application Se-
rial No. 85,364,644 (filed July 6, 2011); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No.
85,727,284 (filed Sept. 12, 2012).
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results in rejection.71 However, if an applicant attests to compliance
with federal law, then registration is possible.72
A further potential barrier to federal registration is the prohibition
on scandalous or immoral trademarks. A trademark examiner refused
a trademark application for the mark “MARIJUANA” because the
mark comprised immoral or scandalous matter.73 Indeed, immoral or
scandalous marks are ineligible for federal registration.74 But, this mo-
rality standard is unclear and depends on whether the mark is “shock-
ing to the sense of truth, decency, or propriety; disgraceful, offensive;
disreputable as scandalous conduct.”75 Whether a mark is scandalous
or immoral is considered in relation to the goods and marketplace for
which the mark is used.76 Morality is thus judged in through context of
use and is a subjective process.77 Nonetheless, humorous or prurient
subject matter can be registered.78 The morality standard is further
complicated as indicated by the USPTO’s willingness to register mari-
juana-related marks.79
Those contemplating less-than-fulsome disclosure to the USPTO
about the intended use of a mark should realize that falsely represent-
ing that a mark is used in lawful commerce entails fraud upon the
Trademark Office.80 This could result in various civil liabilities and
71. TMEP § 907 (5th ed. Sept. 2007); see also rejected application U.S. Trademark
Application Serial No. 85,602,048 (filed Apr. 19, 2012) (“REEFER MADNESS” pub-
lished for opposition for “[e]ntertainment in the nature of an on-going special variety,
news, music or comedy show featuring cannabis, hemp, pot, marijuana, 420, weed,
mary jane broadcast over television, satellite, audio, and video media”).
72. See, e.g., Response to Office Action (June 9, 2011), MEDICAL MARI-
JUANA, Registration Nos. 4,024,120 & 4,133,282.
73. Supplemental Office Action (Oct. 12, 2006), U.S. Trademark Application Se-
rial No. 78,401,566 (filed Apr. 14, 2004) (“MARIJUANA”).
74. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2012); TMEP § 1203.01 (Apr. 2014 ed.).
75. In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 486 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (emphasis omitted) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted); see also In re Mavety Media Grp. Ltd., 33 F.3d 1367,
1371 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
76. In re Boulevard Entm’t, Inc., 334 F.3d 1336, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see also In
re Hepperle, 175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 512, 512 (T.T.A.B. 1972) (finding that
“ACAPULCO GOLD” was not scandalous for use as suntan lotion, despite being a
potential synonym for marijuana).
77. Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Registration of Scandalous, Immoral, and Disparaging
Under Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act: Can One Man’s Vulgarity Be Another’s Regis-
tered Trademark?, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 331, 400 (1993).
78. Id. at 400–01.
79. See, e.g., MEDICAL MARIJUANA, Registration Nos. 4,024,120 & 4,133,282
(“magazines about marijuana serving medicinal purposes”); search for Medical Can-
nabis Cup, Registration No. 4,259,895, JUSTIA (2015), https://trademarks.justia.com/
850/33/medical-cannabis-cup-85033340.html (“[o]rganization and arrangement of edu-
cational and instructional seminars and conferences regarding legal, medical and po-
litical developments and societal attitudes about medical marijuana”).
80. 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COM-
PETITION § 19:51 (4th ed. 2014); see also Fed. Treasury Enter. Sojuzplodoimport v.
Spirits Int’l N.V., 425 F. Supp. 2d 458, 467–68 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
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invalidation of the trademark registration.81 At any rate, regular
marks are only enforceable within the class of goods or services they
are registered under, and so this limits other creative approaches to
get around the USPTO’s current position to refuse registrations on
cannabis products or service marks.
At the same time, a cannabis business could seek to bring a federal
Lanham Act action under Section 43(a) on the basis of improper
claims of affiliation or endorsement.82 Such actions are available even
in the absence of a registered mark, and so the lack of a federal trade-
mark registration would be no obstacle.83 However, it is unlikely that
a federal court would grant relief under 43(a) for a cannabis business
as it would be an implicit acceptance of the “legality” of the cannabis
business or a use of federal instrumentalities to further such federally
illegal activities, similar to the reluctance of federal bankruptcy courts
to preside over cannabis business insolvency proceedings.
Copyright protections for works related to cannabis goods and ser-
vices face little problems for federal registration.84 First, copyright re-
gistration by the Copyright Office is truly registration only—meaning
that little to no examination of the registration occurs.85 At most,
there may be a cursory check whether the submitted work is exactly
identical to another registered work.86 But any real search is impossi-
ble at this point, given the volumes of registered copyrights, the length
of copyright term (life of the author plus seventy years),87 and the fact
that most of these works were registered based on analog or hard
copy artifacts that are not electronically searchable.88 At any rate, this
minimal check for literal copying is not focused on the nature of the
work and so there would be no extra hurdle for works created by or
for use with cannabis businesses.89
Central to our investigation here, though, is the fact that even when
cannabis businesses secure federal patents, trademarks, or copyrights,
81. 15 U.S.C. § 1120 (2012); MCCARTHY, supra note 80; see TMEP § 720 (Apr.
2014 ed.).
82. 15 U.S.C. § 1125.
83. Miller Brewing Co. v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 503 F. Supp. 896, 905–906
(D.R.I. 1980) (stating that the Lanham Act “protects use of valid but unregistered
trademarks”).
84. Rebecca Gan, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: Protection for Mari-
juana Trademarks, A.B.A. Vol. 32, No. 6 (Nov./Dec. 2015), http://
www.americanbar.org/publications/gp_solo/2015/november-december/
intellectual_property_law_protection_marijuana_trademarks.html.
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, DURATION OF COPYRIGHT 1 (2011), http://
www.copyright.gov/circs/circ15a.pdf.
88. See Letter from Howard L. Berman, Member of Cong., to Marybeth Peters,
Register of Copyrights (Jan. 10, 2005), in REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, U.S. COPYRIGHT
OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS 11 (2006), http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/or-
phan-report-full.pdf.
89. Gan, supra note 84.
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those rights may still be subject to seizure and forfeiture under the
CSA. Under the criminal forfeiture provisions, any “tangible and in-
tangible personal property, including rights, privileges, interests,
claims, and securities” are subject to forfeiture if the person owning it
is convicted of a CSA violation punishable by more than a year in
prison.90 The only other requirement is that the property be con-
nected to the criminal activity in either of two ways: (1) it was part of
the proceeds, or derived from those proceeds, obtained directly or in-
directly as the result of such violation; or (2) it was used, or intended
to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the com-
mission of, such violation.91 This applies quite easily to copyrights and
patents. But trademarks pose an odd situation. While the federal re-
gistration could certainly be transferred to the United States under
forfeiture, unless the government subsequently and consistently used
the marks on goods and services in commerce, then the marks would
be deemed abandoned and the registrations would lapse or terminate.
Thus forfeiture in this case might seem a bit hollow, and amount to
more of a destruction of the property. At the same time, it is not clear
what the federal government would do with any cannabis IP—except
of course for patents covering health or industrial applications. Under
the civil forfeiture provisions, title to the IP itself might not be vulner-
able, but any underlying “books, records, and research, including for-
mulas, microfilm, tapes, and data which are used, or intended for use,
in violation of” the CSA may be forfeited.92
2. State Intellectual Property
State IP rights differ from federal IP rights in two important ways.
First, they are only enforceable within the state in which they were
secured.93 Second, they largely arise from use or other actions of the
purported rights holder, and not from examination or registration by a
state official.94 Thus, trademark rights generally arise as a matter of
common law when a mark is “used in commerce” on goods or services
within a particular geographic area.95 Some states offer registration,
but even in those states, rights can still arise simply through use in
commerce.96  Trade secrets arise solely where purported owners take
reasonable steps—generally seen as legal measures such as nondisclo-
sure agreements and physical measures such as keeping information
90. 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)–(b) (2012).
91. § 853(a)(1)–(2).
92. § 881(a)(5).
93. Visintine, supra note 46.
94. Common Law Trademark Rights, BITLAW, http://www.bitlaw.com/trademark/
common.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2016).
95. Protecting Your Trademark, USPTO (2014), http://www.uspto.gov/sites/de
fault/files/trademarks/basics/BasicFacts.pdf.
96. See John T. Cross, The Role of the States in United States Trademark Law, 49
U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 485, 512 n.129 (2011).
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about the secret in a secure location—to keep secrets that give a com-
petitive advantage due to others’ not knowing the information.97
But the lack of titling for state common law IP means that it is hard
to   determine whether such IP is subject to forfeiture under the CSA.
What would this mean as a practical matter? What exactly would be
seized? At the federal level, IP has formal title and substance such as
issued patents, registered trademarks, and copyright registrations. Pat-
ents, in fact, expressly “have the attributes of personal property”
under the Patent Act.98 These property-like titles, and their concomi-
tant rights, can be bought and sold, and thus can be seized and for-
feited.99 But what would it mean to say that common law trade secrets
have been seized? Certainly, any documents codifying the trade secret
can be forfeited. This forfeiture is implied by the civil forfeiture provi-
sion for “books, records, and research, including formulas, microfilm,
tapes, and data which are used, or intended for use, in violation of”
the CSA.100 The information contained within these media could then
be disclosed publicly, destroying the trade secret. But destruction of
the “property” is not forfeiture to the United States as the CSA ex-
pressly vests right, title, and interest in the government.101 Likewise,
common law trademark rights, that are both hard to “transfer” and
similar to federal trademarks, would lapse or terminate as abandoned
if the federal government did not use them on goods or services in
commerce.102
A final note on state trademarks: in the curious situation estab-
lished by the federal-state tension on cannabis, state trademarks have
come into unusual prominence. In conventional business channels,
state trademarks are seen as inferior to federally registered marks.103
State rights are relied on only where federal registration cannot be
obtained.104 But until the USPTO begins registering cannabis marks,
97. James Pooley, TRADE SECRETS the other IP right, WIPO MAG., Mar. 2013,
at 2–3, http://193.5.93.80/export/sites/www/pct/en/news/extracts/2013/wipo_magazine
_03_2013_trade_secrets.pdf.
98. 35 U.S.C. § 261.
99. Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 415 (1945) (explaining
that it “has long been settled” that “a patent is property, protected against appropria-
tion both by individuals and by government,” as a result, courts have declined to issue
antitrust decrees that “amount[ ] to a forfeiture of the patents”).
100. 28 U.S.C. § 881(a)(5).
101. §§ 881(f), (h).
102. § 881(e) (providing for transfer of the forfeited property); 15 U.S.C. § 1127
(2012) (defining abandonment by reference to discontinuation of use “with intent not
to resume such use”).
103. Darryl C. Wilson, The Caribbean Intellectual Property Office (CARIPO): New,
Useful, and Necessary, 19 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 551, 586 n.169; see generally Zvi S.
Rosen, In Search of the Trade-Mark Cases: The Nascent Treaty Power and The Turbu-
lent Origins of Federal Trademark Law, 83 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 827 (2009).
104. Charles E. Colman, An Overview of Intellectual Property Issues Relevant to the
Fashion Industry, ASPATORE, Jan. 2012, at *30, 2012 WL 167352 (explaining that
“[s]tate trademark registrations are less logistically complicated and significantly less
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businesses must rely exclusively on state marks. At the same time, the
intrastate-only jurisdiction of state trademark rights means that rights
established in, say, Colorado, do not reach to Washington State. In the
conventional scenario, the Colorado business would simply start using
its marks on goods or services in commerce in Washington State and
thus establish rights there too. But under the residency requirements
for cannabis licensees in Washington State,105 a Colorado-based busi-
ness, with no Washington State residents involved, could not engage
in state-legal cannabis commercial activities in Washington. But then
the Colorado company cannot establish Washington State trademark
rights. Conversely, if it sought to establish and enforce state trade-
mark rights in Washington, it would be at least tacitly, if not explicitly,
admitting that it was violating Washington’s I-502 and other drug
laws.106 Thus, cannabis businesses seeking to establish multi-state, or
even national, brands are finding significant challenges if they want to
also stay on the right side of state-legal rules.
B. Securities
The second main category of intangible property we are considering
is securities, which for our purposes include everything defined as a
“security” under  federal securities laws.107 Often generally clustered
around the notion of an “investment contract,” securities are used for
businesses to secure capital in order to launch, grow, or transfer own-
expensive than their federal counterparts, but they also confer far fewer benefits, and
thus are usually recommended only where one simply cannot afford to register a mark
with the USPTO”) (emphasis added).
105. See Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 69.50.331(1)(c)(ii) (LexisNexis, LEXIS through
2015 3d Special Sess.).
106. As mentioned above, a cannabis business could seek to use Lanham Act Sec-
tion 43(a) to show false designation of origin. Thus the Colorado business could pur-
sue this tack and steer clear of claiming any use in commerce in Washington State.
But as also discussed above, it is difficult to see a federal court enforcing such a claim.
107. The Securities Act of 1933 defines “security” as:
. . . any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, security-based swap,
bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or partici-
pation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preor-
ganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment
contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, frac-
tional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any put, call,
straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group
or index of securities (including any interest therein or based on the value
thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a
national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or, in general, any
interest or instrument commonly known as a ‘‘security’’, or any certificate of
interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for,
guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the
foregoing.
15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2012).
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ership.108 While there have undoubtedly been many informal—and
perhaps some formal—issuances of securities by cannabis businesses
in the past,109 the state-legal systems of Washington State, Colorado,
Oregon, and Alaska are already presenting the question of whether
state-legal businesses in those states can go through conventional,
above-ground issuances and transfers of securities.
Private offerings and sales of securities are likely already occurring.
If they are structured appropriately as private offerings, then they are
exempt from registering with the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (“SEC”).110 However, they may still need to register with state
securities regulators.111 Presumably, securities regulators in state-legal
jurisdictions will allow the registered offerings so long as regular offer-
ing requirements and disclosures are met. But the interesting question
arises as to whether the SEC would attempt to block registration of a
federal public offering. While the SEC does not technically have the
authority to refuse to register an offering based on the nature of the
securities or investment opportunity (so-called “merits review”),112 it
does have a range of tools to delay or stay registration if it can show
that the proposed disclosure by the issuer to accompany the offering is
inadequate.113 It is also unlawful for any persons to engage in fraudu-
lent stock offerings.114 Notwithstanding all of these, there appears to
be no statutory authority for the SEC to delay or refuse to make effec-
tive the registration statement of a cannabis business that forthrightly
discloses its activities, the nature of the investment, and the significant
risks attendant to investment in an enterprise engaged in transactions
that violate the CSA. Yet, we are hard-pressed to imagine the SEC
making such a registration effective without trying to fight it.
108. Michael Lewis, 6 Things You Need to Know About Raising Capital for a Small
Business, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 23, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
michael-lewis/6-things-you-need-to-know_b_3484069.html.
109. See generally Adrian A. Ohmer, Note, Investing in Cannabis: Inconsistent
Government Regulation and Constraints on Capital, 3 MICH. J. PRIV. EQUITY & VEN-
TURE CAP. L. 97 (2013).
110. Richard J. Morgan, Application of the Securities Laws in Chapter 11 Reorgani-
zations under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 861, 863–67
(1978) (discussing the major exemptions to the SEC registration requirement).
111. Jennifer J. Johnson, Private Placements: A Regulatory Black Hole, 35 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 151, 156–58 (2010) (discussing the legislative history of the National Securi-
ties Markets Improvements Act of 1996 and state regulation of securities prior to and
coexistent with federal regulation). See generally Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P.
Miller, Origin of the Blue Sky Laws, 70 TEX. L. REV. 347 (1991) (discussing historical
origins of state securities regulation).
112. See generally Daniel J. Morrissey, The Road Not Taken: Rethinking Securities
Regulation and the Case for Federal Merit Review, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 647, 686–87
(2010) (criticizing the absence of federal merit review and proposing its implementa-
tion in the SEC).
113. See generally William R. McLucas, Stop Order Proceedings under the Securities
Act of 1933: A Current Assessment, 40 BUS. L. 515, 521 (1985).
114. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (2012).
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While we are unaware of any cannabis businesses’ initial public of-
ferings (“IPOs”), there appear to be some businesses that are report-
ing companies, trading on the so-called “pink sheets” and not on
national stock exchanges.115 In these cases, the businesses either sim-
ply met the triggers that require SEC reporting whether the company
desired it or not, or they were the product of “reverse mergers” in
which the operating cannabis business is nominally acquired by a pub-
licly traded shell, but then becomes the controlling interest of that
shell.116 The apparent lack of cannabis company IPOs may also be due
to the fact that state-legal businesses are only “lawful” within that
state in which it is licensed. Further, residency requirements intention-
ally seek to make it impossible for any individuals or businesses to
own state-legal cannabis enterprises in multiple jurisdictions. Thus, an
SEC-registered, and thus presumptively national, public offering
would be open to investors from across the country (if not the world),
which could result in non-residents of the licensing state unlawfully
becoming owners or beneficial parties of interest in the company.
Cannabis businesses contemplating an IPO may find a recent, can-
nabis ancillary business’ IPO instructive. MassRoots, a social media
app and marijuana advocacy hub, sought to register its IPO and, un-
surprisingly, the SEC had concerns about declaring effective an IPO
of even a cannabis-related business.117 After the SEC requested Mass-
Roots declare whether the company believed they violated federal
law, the company disclosed that “we may be deemed to be aiding and
abetting illegal activities through the services that we provide to users
and advertisers.”118 Following this response, the SEC moved on to dif-
ferent questions,119 thus implying acceptance of the answer. In the
end, as MassRoots officers recount, the SEC had no authorized
115. Sam Becker, Here’s How to Start Investing in Marijuana, CHEAT SHEET (Feb.
21, 2015), http://www.cheatsheet.com/business/investing-in-marijuana-what-you-need-
to-know-before-jumping-in.html.  Substantive analysis of cannabis-related stocks is
also available on websites such as www.marijuanastocks.com.
116. This technique is also used by some foreign businesses to gain access to U.S.
public capital markets where they might otherwise not qualify directly for various
reasons. See, e.g., Nate Nead, GETTING HIGH ON MARIJUANA RTOS, INVEST-
MENTBANK, http://investmentbank.com/marijuana-reverse-merger/ (last visited Apr.
19, 2016).
117. James Joiner, The First Weed Tech IPO, DAILY BEAST (Apr. 6, 2015, 5:25
AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/04/06/the-first-weed-tech-ipo.html;
see generally EDGAR Search Results, SEC (Mar. 14, 2012), https://www.sec.gov/cgi-
bin/browse-edgar?company=massroots&owner=exclude&action=getcompany&
Find=search (displaying SEC filings for MassRoots, Inc.).
118. Letter from Mark P. Shuman, Branch Chief–Legal, to Isaac Dietrich, Chief
Exec. Officer, MassRoots, Inc. (Aug. 8, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/
data/1589149/000000000014040305/filename1.pdf; MassRoots, Inc., Registration
Statement Under the Securities Act of 1933 (Amendment No. 3 to Form S-1) (13)
(Aug. 26, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1589149/00007217481400
0909/msrt082514s1.htm.
119. See Registration Statement of MassRoots, Inc. under the Securities Act of
1933 at 6 (June 13, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1589149/
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grounds for holding up the registration once it satisfied itself that the
firm had disclosed all risk factors, especially including its potential ille-
gal activities.120
It is unclear at this point whether the SEC will let this precedent
drive it to also declare effective the IPO of an actual cannabis busi-
ness—meaning one directly involved in producing or selling cannabis
products—even where all appropriate disclosures of illegal activity are
made. The Authors suspect that the SEC will try to draw another line.
After all, would it—or should it—declare effective the IPO of univer-
sally illegal businesses such as heroin producers or dealers just be-
cause they fully disclose the illegality of their activities? And yet, it is
hard to see where the SEC has clear statutory authority to do any-
thing other than declare effective any registration fully complying with
our federal mandatory disclosure securities system.
But perhaps this slippery slope of cannabis to heroin IPOs is illu-
sory anyway: after all, the disclosures made to the SEC are public and
are almost certainly admissible in court for criminal and civil prosecu-
tion. The heroin producers and dealers will have to have given their
contact information, location, and essentially a road map of their
crimes. Who is going to do that, especially when it seems highly im-
probable that any sane investor would even buy stocks offered in the
IPO, so what is the point of staging the offering? The only reason the
Authors are discussing cannabis IPOs, is because of the state-legal sys-
tems and the DOJ’s uneasy and potentially temporary staying of its
prosecutorial hand for a certain set of cannabis activities that are still
very much illegal under the CSA. And the only reason that there may
be a market for such an IPO is because some segments of the invest-
ing public are willing to bet that legalization is going to spread, and
that the federal government will continue to stay its hand, and possi-
bly even legalize or at least decriminalize in the not-so-distant future.
The occurrence of some or all of those possibilities could cause canna-
bis company stocks to skyrocket, leading to sizable paydays for those
who took the risk and “got in early.” There is no similar set of current
circumstances or future expectations for other illegal activities such as
production or sale of hard drugs.
For purposes of this Article, however, the real issue is forfeiture of
cannabis company stocks, whether procured through public or private
sales. While the CSA civil forfeiture provision for “[a]ll moneys, nego-
tiable instruments, [and] securities”121 may have been primarily drawn
to valuable financial assets that a drug dealer had obtained as or from
000072174814000599/msrt061114s1.htm#RiskFactor (discussing investment risk
factors).
120. See generally, U.S. SEC, EDGAR Company Filings, http://www.sec.gov/edgar/
searchedgar/companysearch.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2016).
121. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (2012).
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proceeds,122 or by leveraging proceeds, from illegal activities, that stat-
ute is not so limited by its text. In other words, it is not only the securi-
ties of random third party companies that a drug dealer may be
holding as part of his personal portfolio (and that can somehow be
linked to “facilitating” those activities), but also securities issued by a
company engaged in illegal activities and held by otherwise “inno-
cent” external shareholders that seem to be subject to forfeiture.
Thus, cannabis investors will have to be aware of not only the con-
ventional investment risk that a portfolio company might fail and its
stock be rendered worthless, but also of the highly unusual risk that
even if the business is successful, the federal government could come
in at any time and seize all securities that facilitated the business—
including those held by the external investors. Further, such investors
likely could not successfully invoke any of the innocent holder or
buyer defenses under the CSA, as they would almost certainly know
that the company was involved in illegal activities. This would espe-
cially be true in any potential future public offering of cannabis stocks,
due to the stringent disclosure requirements of the securities laws and
SEC implementing rules. But it also indicates the reverse point: can-
nabis companies are going to have to be quite comprehensive in their
risk-factor disclosures in private or public offerings. Further, one of
those risks may well be that investors should know that they may be
liable for aiding and abetting the criminal activities just from their in-
vestments—the normal liability shields limiting shareholders’ expo-
sure to just their invested capital likely provide no shield for aiding
and abetting CSA violations by funding those who directly engage in
them.
V. IMPLICATIONS OF CLOUDED TITLE FOR CANNABIS BUSINESS
OWNERS, INVESTORS, AND CREDITORS
As outlined above, most valuable cannabis business assets, as well
as the investment securities issued by the company, are subject to
criminal or civil forfeiture. And while the DOJ is currently holding
back on prosecuting most of the state-legal businesses, this does noth-
ing to remove the de facto clouded title to these assets that will con-
tinue until such time as the CSA is amended and/or “marihuana” is
rescheduled or “descheduled” (removed entirely from CSA Sched-
ules).123 In the meantime, this restraint itself may be making a more
dangerous situation for cannabis business owners, investors, and cred-
itors. By lulling these players into a newly emerging sense of “nor-
malcy” around the state-legal cannabis industry, Congress and the
DOJ’s temporary reprieve may be encouraging these players to relax
122. See, e.g., United States v. Borromeo, 945 F.2d 750 (4th Cir. 1991).
123. Congress could amend the CSA to re- or de-schedule marihuana, or the DOJ
could do so.
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their guard to some degree about the risks they are taking on. The
state-legal systems themselves also facilitate this by enabling “clean
well-lit places” that certainly look like conventional businesses.
But if a harsh reminder of the lurking property risks (not to men-
tion prison sentences and fines!) is needed, cannabis industry players
need only look at recent disorienting cases where insolvent cannabis
businesses were denied the normal protections and processes of fed-
eral bankruptcy courts. In one case, a bankruptcy court denied Chap-
ter 11 bankruptcy protections under the “clean hands” doctrine to a
business that had violated the CSA by knowingly renting space to a
marijuana business.124 In another, the bankruptcy court held that a
Colorado couple who ran a state-legal marijuana business was not en-
titled to federal bankruptcy protection even though the couple’s activ-
ities were in compliance with state law.125 Although there may be
alternatives such as state receivership, the lack of bankruptcy protec-
tions is another factor that cannabis businesses, together with their
investors and creditors, must consider.
Beyond the personal risk to owners, investors, and creditors, the
clouded title issue also presents a systemic risk to the emerging canna-
bis industry. What other industry could launch and flourish where vir-
tually all of the relevant business assets were held under clouded title?
Is this not one of the primary problems that limit the development of
entrepreneurship and industry in countries without adequate rule of
law? In other words, where prospective business owners operate
under legitimate fears that government agents will swoop in and seize
inventory, assets, and real property at any time, can sustainable, long-
term growth and mature industry arise? And what private citizens or
institutions will invest, lend, or provide materials on credit in such an
environment? Yet, this is essentially what society is asking our new
state-legal cannabis industries and their investors, creditors, and sup-
pliers to do.
Admittedly, this is at one level exactly the point behind the CSA
and its forfeiture provisions: Congress wanted to make it extraordina-
rily difficult for illegal drug producers and dealers to engage in busi-
ness—in other words, there should be no such thing as “business as
usual” in these areas. But a number of states have spoken now, and
even Congress has tentatively stayed the hand of the DOJ (which had
already more or less restrained itself for the time being).126 A sense
124. In re Rent-Rite Super Kegs W. Ltd., 484 B.R. 799, 807 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2012).
125. In re Arenas, No. 14-11406, 2014 WL 4288991 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2014) (“The
impossibility of lawfully administering the Debtors’ bankruptcy estate under chapter 7
constitutes cause for dismissal of the Debtors’ case under 11 U.S.C. § 707(a).”).
126. Cole Memo II, supra note 22. Congress, meanwhile, used a recent omnibus
spending bill to continue prohibiting the DOJ from using funds to prevent states from
implementing their medical marijuana laws.  Jacob Sullum, Congress Did Not Legal-
ize Medical Marijuana, FORBES (Dec. 31, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jacobsul
lum/2015/12/31/congress-did-not-legalize-medical-marijuana/.
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that the federal government should at least allow these state experi-
ments to run their course seems to have emerged across the country.
But unless the intent is to sabotage such experiments, the federal gov-
ernment needs to find ways to allow the early pioneers of this new
industry to operate in a reasonable facsimile of the normal business
environment that other regulated industries enjoy. Otherwise, the va-
rious states—together with a complicit Obama Administration—will
have simply created expensive, risky, yet doomed-to-fail ventures and
regulatory systems. Let us instead seek to take best advantage of this
experimental opportunity to see if legal and well-regulated cannabis
markets can work and produce net social benefits.
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